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Abstract 
This study examines the impact of conditional cash transfers (CCTs) for on sex ratios, health and 
nutrition of children. The main hypothesis is that CCTs may alter the perceived economic value 
of girls relative to boys, leading to more favorable sex ratios and better nutrition. Several studies 
have tried to explain the puzzling persistence of malnutrition inspite of rapid increases in economic 
growth and the reasons range from decreases in physical activity (Deaton and Dreze 2009) to the 
“South Asian Enigma” (Ramalingaswami, et al, 1997). The “South Asian enigma” underscores 
gender disparities as the main reason for the poor nutritional status despite high growth (Smith et 
al, 2003). We use data from the National Family Health Surveys (NFHS 2005-06 and 2015-16) to 
explore if cash transfer schemes for education make a positive and significant difference to sex 
ratios, nutrition and health seeking behavior. Our results suggest that cash transfer schemes have 
a positive but moderate impact on nutrition among eligible and non-eligible households, a positive 
impact on health seeking behaviors and that there are regional variations related to the 
implementation of the scheme 
  
Introduction 
Malnutrition among children is a persistent problem in India despite the country’s economic 
growth of 6-7 percent over 1995-20131. Although stunting has declined, the decline has been less 
than one percentage point per year and wasting among children under five has increased from 19.8 
percent in 2005-06 to 21 percent in 2015-16. Several studies have argued that the reasons for the 
decline in nutritional status could be a decrease in physical activity (Deaton and Dreze 2009), 
increases in the relative price of food (Gaiha, Jha and Kulkarni. 2010), to the “Asian Engima” that 
focuses on gender disparities (Ramalingaswami, Jonsson, & Rohde 1997).  The nutritional status 
of children particularly those under- five  seems to be closely correlated to the Asian Engima since 
persistent forms of gender based discrimination often affect caregiving abilities.  
 
A key role in addressing gender disparities is played by education and universal primary education 
is an objective of the Government of India. It is estimated that annually the government incurred 
a fiscal burden of Rs. 39622 crores on primary education in 2013 (GOI). In addition, state 
governments in India incurred fiscal burdens ranging from Rs. 1622 crores to Rs. 18126 crores on 
elementary education and different state funded schemes for education of the girl child (Dongre et 
al, 2013; Sekher, 2012).   
Conditional cash transfer (CCT) schemes introduced by various Indian states provide financial 
incentives to families of girls if the birth of the girl is registered. These may offer different 
monetary benefits but have similarities such  payments for immunizations and enrollment in 
Anganwadis (local village centers), payments for school enrollment and completion and payments 
at the time of marriage of the daughter or until she is 18 years old. The schemes make it mandatory 
for the families to visit the local centers which concurrently run education and health programs for 
women. It is estimated that approximately, 36,770 girls were enrolled into Dhanlakshmi scheme, 
during 2008 to 2013 in 7 states (Sekher and Ram, 2015). 
We examine the impact of conditional cash transfers (CCTs) on sex ratios, health care and 
nutrition of children. The main hypothesis is that CCTs may alter the perceived economic value 
of girls relative to boys, leading to better nutrition and health care. 
 
1 https://community.data.gov.in/gdp-growth-rate-of-india-constant-prices-during-2001-02-to-2013-14/ 
We use data from the National Family Health Surveys (NFHS 2005-06 and 2015-16) to  examine 
the impact of the CCT on nutritional outcomes for girls using both anthropometric measurements 
and a diet diversity index. Second, we examine health seeking behavior which comprises 
immunizations, breastfeeding, treatment for Diarrhea and visits to the local health center, and test 
for differences among eligible and non-eligible households. Finally we aim to explore if the cash 
transfer was associated in differences in age at marriage and fertility decisions. 
Our results suggest that cash transfer schemes for education have a moderate impact on nutrition 
among eligible and non-eligible households and that there are regional variations related to the 
conditionality and implementation of the scheme.  
I. Overview of the literature  
Unitary household models are often contrasted with collective decision making wherein household 
members jointly influence the consumption and production decisions. An important implication of 
this literature is that transfers can act as a mechanism for changing the relative bargaining power 
of recipients and, also have differential impacts on the household members based on the identity 
of the recipient.  
Conditional cash transfers are a preferred instrument to equalize outcomes for male and female 
children if gender bias exists. They also minimize wastage of resources and overcome problems 
of asymmetric information. We focus on CCTs for education primarily because they change the 
perceived economic value of girls to boys, by meeting a part of the expenditure on girls.  The time 
lag associated with the complete payment also serves to delay the age at marriage and also affecting 
fertility choices. 
Evidence on the impact of CCTs on education, health, nutrition, and poverty is mixed. Schemes in 
Latin America notably Progresa Oportunidades in Mexico, Bolsa Familia in Brazil, and Bono de 
Desarrollo Humano in Ecuador have had a positive impact on enrolment, improved nutritional 
status, reduced mortality and morbidity among young children and reduced rates of poverty (Leroy 
et al., 2009; Macours et al, 2012; Maluccio & Flores, 2005). In Ghana and Tanzania, cash transfers 
resulted in a higher utilization of health insurance schemes (Davis et al., 2013). 
On the other hand, there are programs like the Family Allowance program (PRAF) in Honduras  
(Moore, 2008), and  Programa Bolsa Alimentação (PBA) in Brazil where recipients gained less 
weight compared to those who were not part of the program (Martins et al, 2013).  
A disadvantage of CCTs could be that households might prefer to send children to work to 
supplement family income but are instead forced to send them to school. Furthermore, 
participation in a CCT may well be a function of household income. The poorest households may 
not be able to participate if the costs involved in participating such as transport, loss of income, 
lack of information on benefits are too high (Bassett, 2008) 
In India, state level CCTs for education are a relatively recent development and the impact of the 
cash transfers schemes in India has been confined to individual schemes and state level analysis 
on educational outcomes. The spillover benefit of transfers for education on health especially the 
behavior of caregiver, has not been documented in the literature. Given the conditions imposed by 
the schemes in terms of visiting the local anganwadis and payments till the child turns 18 years of 
age, it is useful to examine if the cash transfer induces a change in the behavior of parents who 
view girls as an economic burden. 
II. Conceptual framework 
II.1 How do CCTs work?  
CCTs can work to affect health and education outcomes for girls in four ways. First, they provide 
extra resources to the household for investment in girls, thereby relaxing the budget constraint. 
This would assume that girls are treated as luxury goods. Second, they might change the perceived 
economic value of females relative to males. Third, CCTs for education of girls can encourage 
delays in marriages having an impact not only on fertility but also conferring intergenerational 
nutritional and health benefits. Finally, based on the identity of recipients, CCTs can alter the 
intrahousehold dynamics giving a greater weight to the recipient and influence their health seeking 
behavior for girls (Leroy et al, 2009). 
While the exact mechanism by which the CCTs work may not be ascertainable, a successful CCT 
program, can help achieve a level of investment in human capital that is higher than what a cash 
constrained household will choose based on their private costs and benefits.  The efficacy of the 
transfer could however be a function of various factors related to the design, identification and 
implementation of the program. The size and duration of the cash transfer should cover the direct 
and indirect costs of participation, compensating households such that there is an incentive to avail 
of the grant; yet at the same time it should discourage households from becoming completely 
dependent. 
II.2 Conditional Cash Transfers in India 
The Government of India as well as different state governments have introduced schemes that 
transfer cash to recipients either for health, natal services or education. CCTs known as Ladli or 
Lakshmi schemes in India offer monetary transfers to families, rewarding them on the birth of a 
girl. While eligibility criteria differ, common features are payment at birth, cash for immunizations 
and visits to Anganwadis (health centers), school enrollment and at the time of marriage of the 
daughter or until she is 18 years old. The schemes are conditional on the woman visiting the local 
health centers which concurrently run education and health programs for adult women. 
Table 1 illustrates some of these schemes. Our analyses are restricted to those states that introduce 
schemes for the girl child’s education. These include Delhi, Haryana, Karnataka, Goa, Madhya 
Pradesh. We restrict the analyses to these states because most national level schemes were 
introduced prior or 2006, with the exception of the Dhanlakshmi scheme and the Janani Suraksha 
Yojana. The Janani Suraksha Yojana however is focused on reducing maternal and neo-natal 
mortality but not education. A cash benefit of Rs.500 is provided for every live birth to a woman 
from poor households and Rs.100 in rural areas and Rs. 200 in urban areas if the woman delivers 
in a institution.  
The Dhanlakshmi scheme provides a cash transfer of Rs 100,000 at the age of 18 years to the 
family of unmarried girls, if they register the birth of a girl child and provide information on 
immunization, enrollment in school. The scheme was implemented in eleven  blocks  in the states 
of Bihar, Jharkhand, Chattisgarh, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh,   Punjab and Uttar Pradesh (UNDP, 
2009).  
III. Data and Methodology 
We use data from the National Family Health Survey 2005 and 2015, focusing on demographic 
information (age, sex, caste, education), an index of economic status and information on mother 
and child characteristics especially health seeking behavior, breastfeeding and nutrition.  We treat 
the introduction of a cash transfer schemes as a natural experiment thus exploiting regional and 
temporal variation across households. To identify households that benefit from the scheme we use 
a dummy to indicate state of residence, the wealth quintile and the number of daughters alive which 
would make the household eligible for receiving financial assistance on the birth of a daughter. 
These households are then compared with those in the control group.  
Since the CCT programs were launched state wise, we estimate the impact on children or girls who 
were eligible in the state with those households within the sample that were not eligible for the 
assistance. Our identification strategy uses an interaction term of year with eligibility for the 
program, to obtain DID estimates. We also assume that prior to the program, all other cash transfer 
programs had a national coverage, therefore the trends in our dependent variables would be similar.  
The eligibility criteria of most schemes states that the families have incomes below a threshold 
level and have two girls. The NFHS does not provide data on incomes but an asset index. We use 
this asset index to compute wealth quintiles to identify households below a threshold of income. 
Women with less than two children and girls with two siblings or less and born after a certain date 
are considered eligible. Thus our eligibility criteria is based on the wealth quintile, presence of two 
or less girls in the household and the state of residence. 
We use a standard approach to regress the dependent variable on community/district or state level 
fixed effects, cohort fixed effects, and the interaction of the program with an indicator for exposure 
to the program. Our specification is  𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝛽  +  𝛽0 (𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗 𝑥 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡)  +  𝛿𝑗  +  𝜂𝑡  +  𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘 
Where 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the outcome of interest for the ith child, jth household, at year t 𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗 is a dummy for whether the household was eligible for the CCT scheme. It takes a 
value of 1 if the household is eligible based on the wealth index, and had less than two girls, and 
0 otherwise 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 is a dummy taking a value 1 for observations from 2015, and 0 otherwise  𝛿𝑗  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝜂𝑡 are community/state and cohort fixed effects respectively 
We focus on two indicators of nutritional status – anthropometric measures and diet diversity 
index.  
For health seeking behavior we use vaccinations, breast feeding, treatment for Diarrhea and a 
check up for the baby within two months of birth, immunization).  
 
IV. Results 
Table 2 shows the sex ratios in selected states based on the Population Cenuses of 2001 and 2011 
and also Calculations for the NFHS data. Computed as the ratio of sons to daughters within a 
household, the data indicate that with the exception of Madhya Pradesh, eligible households in 
other states saw an increase in the number of daughters.   
Table 3 shows the summary statistics of the sample for eligible households. The Height-for-age 
and Weight-for-age zscores and weight-for-height zscores improved slightly over time.  The 
percentage of children who are stunted and underweight declined from 2005 to 2015. The 
prevalence of Diarrhea decreased in both males and females and there is a notable increase in the 
number of post-natal check-ups within two months of birth for both girls and boys, although the 
vaccinations declined slightly.  Both the mother’s and father’s education increased marginally, and 
this was also accompanied with an increase in the age of the mother. Most of the households are 
in rural areas and belong to the cultivator, agricultural laborer and labor not elsewhere classified 
categories (results not reported in table 3).  
Table 4 shows the results of regressing the health outcome on the treatment viz the program. 
Stunting, wasting and underweight declined following the scheme, although the decline was 
modest. The diet diversity index showed an increase although it is not statistically significant. 
Exploring the health seeking behavior we find that breastfeeding decreased for the entire sample 
but immunizations, treatment for diarrhea and a check-up for the baby within two months of birth 
increased (Table 5). The result on breastfeeding probably implies a reallocation of time since to 
access the benefits of the scheme, mothers could well be queuing up at centers to register the birth 
of the child and at anganwadis to avail the  benefits.  
Anthropometric outcomes improved for boys more relative to girls, but only marginally. The diet 
diversity index increased more for girls but it is not statistically significant. The most noticeable 
change is in health seeking behavior especially vaccinations and treatment for Diarrhea increased 
more for girls. This is significant since Diarrhea is widely prevalent in India and is a cause of 
impaired growth (Table 6 and Table 7) 
V. Conclusions:  
This study contributes to the literature on unitary and collective models of household decision by 
exploring if conditional cash transfer schemes for education of females have any effect on 
nutritional status of, health seeking behavior for female children. Sex ratios in India are on average 
919 (Census, 2011) and the north agricultural region is particularly known for its strong son 
preference since women are perceived to a be a liability because of huge transfers of assets made 
to them at the time of marriage. Against this background, cash transfer schemes not only help meet 
educational costs but by a system of delayed payments, aim to encourage parents to invest in the 
health and education of daughters. 
The use of cross sectional data that does not specifically include data on cash transfers poses 
substantial challenges for assessing their effectiveness. We use two rounds of the data as before 
and after introduction of the program and compare the effects with those households within the 
state that were not eligible for the transfer. Our identification is based not on actual participation 
in the scheme but the assumption that all eligible households were covered by the scheme which 
can be subject to errors of exclusion, if eligible households chose not to participate.  
An empirical problem is that if there are changes in underlying attitudes or preferences towards 
investing in girls then the estimate will capture the effect of both the introduction of the CCT and 
the preference change. 
This paper is an ongoing study that does not claim to establish a causal relationship between cash 
transfer schemes and health and education outcomes. It intends to highlight the spillover benefits 
of cash transfers, suggesting that schemes designed for improving investments in one development 
indicator may be correlated strongly with other forms of investment in human capital.  
Although the anthropometric outcomes show a very modest improvement, health seeking 
behavior, particularly treatment for Diarrhea, post-natal check-ups and vaccinations showed an 
improvement for both boys and girls. However, these results cannot be and should not be 
interpreted as evidence of a causal relationship especially given the severe limitations of a lack of 
data on household participation in the scheme and the actual benefits received. Further analysis 
required to isolate the effects of any scheme on households.  
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Table 1: Conditional Cash transfer schemes in India 
National Coverage State Coverage 
Dhanlakshmi  (2008)  Ladli Scheme, 2008  (Delhi)  
 
Janani SurakshaYojana (2005)  Ladli Scheme, Haryana 
Balika Samridhi Yojana (1997)  
  
Ladli Scheme, Goa, 2011-12  (Tamil Nadu) 
 
National Program for Education of 
Girls at elementary –level under the 
Sarva Shiksha Abhiyaan (2003)  
 
Bhagyalakshmi scheme (2011), (Karnataka) 
Kasturba Gandhi Balika Vidyalaya 
Scheme, (2004)  
 
Ladli Lakshmi Scheme, Madhya Pradesh, 2011 
  
 
Source: Department of Women and Child Development http://www.wcddel.in/streesakti_3Ladli.html  
2. https://govinfo.me/ladli-scheme-haryana/ 3 http://www.newincept.com/madhyapradesh/ladli-lakshmi-yojana-
madhya-pradesh.html 4. http://www.mp.gov.in/en/web/wcd/we-lly  
 
Table 2: Sex ratios in India 
No. State 2011 Census 2001 Census 20151 20051 
  Sex 
ratio 
Child sex 
ratio (0-
6) 
Sex 
ratio 
Child sex 
ratio (0-6) 
Ratio of 
Males to 
females 
Ratio of 
Males to 
females 
 India 943 919 933 927 - - 
1 Goa 973 942 961 938 0.91 0.97 
2 Karnataka 973 948 965 946 0.91 0.97 
3 Madhya 
Pradesh 931 918 919 932 
1.01 0.92 
4 Haryana 879 834 861 819 0.68 0.99 
5 Delhi 868 871 821 868 0.90 1.02 
Source: Census of India, 2011, https://www.census2011.co.in/sexratio.php 
1 Author’s calculations based on NFHS data  
  
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for eligible households, NFHS 2005, 2015 
 Male Female Male Female 
 2005 2015 
Child age in years 2.20 1.93 2.21 1.92 
HAZ -2.20 -1.97 -1.77 -1.62 
WAZ -2.32 -2.14 -1.86 -1.75 
WHZ -1.60 -1.38 -1.22 -1.09 
% Stunting 0.57 0.50 0.46 0.42 
% Underweight 0.63 0.56 0.45 0.41 
% Wasting 0.36 0.31 0.27 0.24 
Had Diarrhea recently 0.20 0.21 0.13 0.16 
Postnatal check up 
within 2 months of 
birth 
0.08 0.10 0.35 0.37 
Ever had vaccination 0.88 0.91 0.85 0.88 
Years of mothers 
education 
3.36 3.33 3.55 3.67 
Age of mother 26.55 24.31 28.00 25.84 
Age at marriage 14.94 15.68 14.43 14.47 
Age of household head 39.74 40.39 40.03 41.04 
Year of education of 
Partner/husband 
2.00 2.52 2.66 3.09 
Rural 0.88 0.86 0.93 0.93 
Poorest 0.52 0.47 0.52 0.49 
Poorer 0.48 0.53 0.48 0.51 
Middle 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Richer 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Richest 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total Living Children 3.23 2.28 2.97 2.19 
Sons Alive 1.90 0.84 1.65 0.77 
Daughters alive 1.34 1.44 1.31 1.43 
N 629 831 3394 4959 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Regression of Nutritional Status on Eligibility for cash transfer, NFHS, 2005, 2015 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Stunting Underweight Wasting DDI 
Eligibility*time -0.04** 
(0.02) 
-0.07+ 
(0.02) 
-0.05+ 
(0.02) 
0.21 
(0.33) 
Constant -0.70+ 
(0.09) 
-1.14+ 
(0.09) 
-0.87+ 
(0.11) 
4.45+ 
(0.12) 
N 35153.00 35153.00 35153.00 38096.00 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, + p < 0.01 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Regression of health seeking behavior on eligibility for cash transfer, NFHS, 2005, 
2015 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Breast 
feeding 
Vaccinations Post natal 
check 
Treatment 
for Diarrhea 
Eligibility* Time -0.07+ 
(0.01) 
0.72+ 
(0.17) 
0.05+ 
(0.02) 
0.10** 
(0.04) 
Constant 0.59+ 
(0.01) 
10.14+ 
(0.06) 
0.14+ 
(0.01) 
0.84+ 
(0.01) 
N 38096.00 38096.00 24193.00 2963.00 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, + p < 0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Regression of Health variables for boys, NFHS, 2005, 2015  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Regression of Health variables for Girls, NFHS, 2005, 2015 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Stunting Underweight Wasting DDI Breast 
Feeding 
Vaccinations Post 
Natal 
Check 
Treatment 
for 
Diarrhea 
Time* 
eligibility 
0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.04** 
(0.02) 
0.38 
(0.46) 
-0.06+ 
(0.02) 
0.82+ 
(0.23) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.14** 
(0.06) 
Constant 0.41+ 
(0.01) 
0.40+ 
(0.01) 
0.20+ 
(0.01) 
4.46+ 
(0.21) 
0.60+ 
(0.01) 
10.10+ 
(0.09) 
0.11+ 
(0.01) 
0.85+ 
(0.02) 
N 16884.00 16884.00 16884.00 18161.00 18161.00 18161.00 11065.00 1344.00 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Stunting Underweight Wasting DDI Breast 
Feeding 
Vaccinations Post 
Natal 
Check 
Treatment 
for 
Diarrhea 
Time* 
eligibility 
-0.07+ 
(0.03) 
-0.10+ 
(0.02) 
-0.06+ 
(0.02) 
0.09 
(0.48) 
-0.09+ 
(0.02) 
0.58** 
(0.25) 
0.07+ 
(0.02) 
-0.07+ 
(0.03) 
Constant 0.41+ 
(0.01) 
0.40+ 
(0.01) 
0.24+ 
(0.01) 
3.93+ 
(0.15) 
0.58+ 
(0.01) 
10.18+ 
(0.08) 
0.16+ 
(0.01) 
0.41+ 
(0.01) 
N 18269.00 18269.00 18269.00 19935.00 19935.00 19935.00 13128.00 18269.00 
